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THE ABUSE OF OFFSETS AS PROCOMPETITIVE
JUSTIFICATIONS: RESTORING THE PROPER
ROLE OF EFFICIENCIES AFTER OHIO V.
AMERICAN EXPRESS AND NCAA V. ALSTON
Ted Tatos and Hal Singer*
ABSTRACT
Under the rule-of-reason framework, litigation involving the NCAA
has condoned the practice of crediting purported benefits to one group
as an “offset” to antitrust injury suffered by another. Although the
Ohio v. American Express decision addressed countervailing effects
on merchants versus cardholders within the same two-sided market
(credit cards), NCAA v. Alston, consistent with the 1986 NCAA v.
Board of Regents decision, acknowledged procompetitive
justifications that occur in an entirely different market (the output
market for viewing sporting events) than the market in which harm
occurred (the labor market for college athletes). Both cases elevated
the welfare of consumers above that of injured workers (Alston) or
other input providers (American Express). In Alston, the Supreme
Court muted any intent it may have had to cabin its American Express
decision to two-sided transactional platforms defined by indirect
network effects. Further, the blind search for offsets in single-firm
monopolization cases such as American Express and in wage-fixing
cases such as Alston evinces a clear incongruity with the prohibition
against cross-market offsets in merger evaluation. This Article
discusses how a logical error in NCAA v. Board of Regents opened
the door to justifying harms to workers through even the feeblest
claims of consumer benefit. As American Express and Alston have
blurred the lines between offsets that cross-market lines, we explain
that the terms “intergroup” and “intragroup” offsets accurately
* Hal Singer is a Managing Director at Econ One and Adjunct Professor at Georgetown’s
McDonough School of Business. Ted Tatos is a Consultant at Econ One and Associate Economics Editor
of the Antitrust Bulletin. The Authors thank Mark Glick for valuable comments.
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describe benefits and harms that occur to different constituencies
versus those that affect the same, respectively. Although the
rule-of-reason lens properly concerns itself with the latter, the former
falls under the ambit of the legislative branch. As such, we argue for
statutory repeal of American Express and a prohibition on judicial
balancing of claimed benefits to any group other than the group that
suffered antitrust injury. The search for offsets has resulted in the
justification of harms to labor even in the presence of direct evidence
of antitrust injury to workers, a clear erosion of per se adjudication of
cartel behavior by expanding the definition of ancillary restraints.
Consistent with the broader policy of protecting labor from
anticompetitive conduct, including the exercise of monopsony power,
legislative intervention should prohibit such balancing. In wage-fixing
cases involving multiple defendants, the no-offset rule would
immediately condemn the restraint and bar courts from considering
any claimed efficiencies, regardless of whom they benefit. In
single-firm monopsony cases, the no-offset rule would bar courts from
considering any offsetting benefits to parties other than the injured
group of workers or input providers.
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INTRODUCTION
If the Supreme Court’s decision in Ohio v. American Express
presaged the hurdles that both private plaintiffs and regulatory
agencies would face when bringing antitrust claims in its wake,1 its
ruling in NCAA v. Alston offered new hope, or at least a glimmer of it.
Antitrust scholars, left simultaneously puzzled and disheartened by the
incomprehensible logic of American Express, warmly embraced the
Court’s unanimous condemnation in Alston of the National Collegiate
Athletic Association’s (NCAA) restraint on education-related athlete
compensation. 2 Justice Kavanaugh’s concurring opinion echoed the
sentiment of Judge Milan Smith’s concurrence in the Ninth Circuit’s
earlier decision in Alston and signaled that, while antitrust enforcement
against entrenched market power may be handicapped, it can still
wield a sword when it so chooses.3
Although regulatory agencies, scholars, practitioners, and
journalists have dissected American Express, the Alston opinion
remains in its infancy, and its precedential effects are still unclear. This
decision warrants attention not only regarding what the Court said but
also as to where it remained silent. Our Article focuses on the latter
and the concomitant implications for interpreting American Express,
whose repeal via statutory intervention we join other antitrust scholars
in supporting. In particular, by cabining its opinion to the narrow
confines of the restraint at issue, namely education-related benefits, the
Court in Alston declined to address the broader cap on athlete labor
compensation. Likewise, although Justice Barrett posed the question
to Solicitor General Prelogar during oral arguments, the Court
ultimately sidestepped the issue of offsetting anticompetitive harms in
1. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Sabre Holdings Corp., 938 F.3d 43, 52–53 (2d Cir. 2019) (discussing
the impact of the Court’s decision on the parties’ briefing in the case). See generally Ohio v. Am. Express
Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).
2. See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Douglas Melamed, Competition Law as Common Law: American
Express and the Evolution of Antitrust, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 2061, 2105–06 (2020); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust:
What Went Wrong and How to Fix It, 35 ANTITRUST, Summer 2021, at 33, 39–41; Herbert Hovenkamp,
Platforms and the Rule of Reason: The American Express Case, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 35, 50–51.
3. See NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2169 (2021) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); see also Alston
v. NCAA (In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.), 958 F.3d 1239, 1266–71 (9th Cir.
2020) (Smith, J., concurring), aff’d sub nom. NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021).
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the relevant market with claimed procompetitive justifications that
occur elsewhere.4 Nonetheless, the question’s lack of answer has cast
a cloud of uncertainty over the interpretation of such offsets. And the
fact that the Court would even consider an offset to a party distinct
from the one that suffered antitrust injury (before ultimately rejecting
it due to lack of empirical rigor) leaves open the door for future
defendants to pursue these offsets in defense of anticompetitive
conduct.
We do not intend to understate the importance of the Alston ruling
in both acknowledging the anticompetitive harms wrought by the
leverage of monopsony power and in correcting lower courts’
misinterpretation of its prior dicta in NCAA v. Board of Regents as
settled law.5 Notwithstanding its significant limitations, this decision
was long overdue. Even so, a somewhat wounded NCAA cartel still
maintains its collusive restraint on athlete compensation and continues
to seek out an antitrust exemption in an effort to preserve by statute
what market realities continue to expose as indefensible under antitrust
law. For the moment, however, the surviving restraint on direct
compensation for athlete labor proffers a stark reminder of antitrust’s
failure to enjoin this conduct even in the face of clear and obvious
direct evidence of worker harm, despite Justice Scalia’s reference to
collusion as “the supreme evil of antitrust” in Verizon
Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP.6 To wit,
the most significant current cracks in the NCAA’s hegemony over
intercollegiate athletic labor did not result from Alston, but rather result
from statutory intervention loosening the cartel’s grip over athletes’
4. Transcript of Oral Argument at 85, NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021) (No. 20-512).
5. See Deppe v. NCAA, 893 F.3d 498, 501–02 (7th Cir. 2018). In Deppe, the court relied on dicta in
NCAA v. Board of Regents to hold that where an NCAA rule or regulation fosters the tradition of
amateurism in college sports, the regulation is presumed to be competitive under the Sherman Act. Id.;
NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
6. Verizon Commc’ns. Inc. v. Law Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004). The
Trinko Court’s commentary reflects the Chicago School’s postwar shift from unilateral to collusive
conduct concerns under the leadership of Aaron Director and John McGee. See Robert Van Horn,
Chicago’s Shifting Attitude Toward Concentrations of Business Power (1934–1962), 34 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 1527, 1527 (2011). In 1948, Henry Simons, regarded by some as the progenitor of the “Old School”
Chicago view, argued that “the great enemy of democracy is monopoly, in all its forms,” though his
definition encompassed both collusive conduct (e.g., “trade associations and other agencies for price
control”) and trade unions. HENRY C. SIMONS, ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A FREE SOCIETY 43 (1948).
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abilities to monetize their own name, image, and likeness (NIL)—a
result more appropriately attributed to Alston’s predecessor, O’Bannon
v. NCAA.7
This Article is organized as follows. Part I begins with an overview
of offsets and argues that inter- and intra-market offsets signal a
formulaic rather than substantive distinction in the wake of American
Express and Alston. 8 It then focuses on the specious economic
justifications for balancing direct harm to one group (athletes) through
nebulous justifications of benefits to another group (sports fans),
which are amply underscored in the latter.9 In Part II, we revisit the
Supreme Court’s Board of Regents decision and explain how a logical
error therein has permeated throughout its judicial progeny and
continues to stave off attempts to correct direct harms to labor under
antitrust law.10 Part III concludes by offering policy prescriptions that
would remedy the current use of offsets by courts and defense experts
as an economic trump card that permits the most ill-defined and
specious defenses to negate even direct and irrefutable evidence of
antitrust injury to workers or other input providers. 11 Antitrust law
clearly aims to protect workers and other input providers, yet the
application of the consumer welfare standard has rendered their
interests subservient to those of consumers. Redressing this
asymmetric application of antitrust law warrants a narrowly tailored
legislative intervention to restore the protections to input providers.

I. INTRAGROUP AND INTERGROUP OFFSETS AND BALANCING UNDER

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
See infra Part I.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
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THE RULE OF REASON

This Part begins by explaining the general definition of balancing
antitrust harm against procompetitive benefits within antitrust’s rule of
reason.12 It then explains why the incongruence of American Express
and Alston has stripped the terms “cross-market balancing” or
“market-specificity rule” of substantive meaning by widening such
balancing beyond the confines of any relevant antitrust market.13
A. The Ambit of Procompetitive Offsets
Discussion of the treatment of offsets under antitrust law and
economic justifications (or lack thereof) warrants a clear definition of
the concept. Under the rule-of-reason’s burden-shifting framework,
the crediting of offsets refers to balancing anticompetitive harm
against some claimed benefit that fosters competition (the
“competitive-process approach”) or may address a market failure (the
“market-failure approach”).14 The former approach elevates protection
of the “competitive process,” a commonly-used yet admittedly
nebulous term, while the latter seeks to promote efficiency,
presumably by increasing output, lowering prices, fostering
innovation, or improving product quality. 15 Indeed, the inefficiency
that the market-failure approach seeks to correct can manifest itself
through steady-state disequilibrium, where the quantity supplied falls
short of meeting demand. Thus, the market-failure approach shares
some substantive goals with the “checklist” approach adopted by the
Tenth Circuit in Law v. NCAA.16

12. See infra Part I.A.
13. See infra Part I.B.
14. Scholars have observed that the rule of reason has permitted defendants to begin “increasingly
numerous and creative explanations for their behavior. . . . Examination of the relevant case law reveals
multiple competing approaches and seemingly irreconcilable opinions.” See John M. Newman,
Procompetitive Justifications in Antitrust Law, 94 IND. L.J. 501, 501 (2019).
15. For an extensive and detailed treatment of efficiencies in antitrust law, see generally Mark Glick
& Gabriel A. Lozada, The Erroneous Foundations of Law and Economics (INET, Working Paper No.
149,
2021),
https://www.ineteconomics.org/uploads/papers/WP_149-Glick-and-Lozada.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4S5S-H6RR].
16. See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1021–24 (10th Cir. 1998).
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Balancing offsets that accrue to constituencies in a different market
against harm to those in another market altogether have been labeled
cross-market balancing or the application of the market-specificity
rule.17 We proffer the terms “intergroup” and “intragroup” offsets as
more accurate descriptions of countervailing harms between and
within parties, respectively. We refer to procompetitive benefits and
anticompetitive restraint affecting the same group as intragroup offsets
to distinguish them from intergroup offsets—that is, those where
harms and benefits accrue to different constituencies, even though, as
in American Express, they may be considered part of the same
“multi-sided” market.18
Certainly, balancing the anticompetitive effects of restraints on
trade with those deemed to enhance competition has a long history and
reflects the acknowledgment that antitrust laws only condemn
“unreasonable” restraints. Conceptual support for balancing claimed
procompetitive effects against a restraint’s harms to competition as the
“true test of legality” harkens back to the Supreme Court’s opinion in

17. Daniel A. Crane, Balancing Effects Across Markets, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 397, 397 (2015); Gregory
J. Werden, Cross-Market Balancing of Competitive Effects: What Is the Law, and What Should It Be?, 43
J. CORP. L. 119, 119 (2017).
18. Other scholars have prescribed a focus on harm to competition that “lowers the welfare of the
merging parties’ trading partners.” C. Scott Hemphill & Nancy L. Rose, Mergers That Harm Sellers, 127
YALE L.J. 2078, 2100 (2018). That focus is on the trading partners rather than solely on the downstream
purchasers and sellers:
The symmetric treatment of monopoly and monopsony in antitrust law protects the
competitive process and the welfare of the merging firms’ trading partners, whether
purchasers or sellers. Reduced competition between buyers may well harm
downstream purchasers, even where that harm is infeasible to prove, but that
reduced competition is unlawful even where in fact there is no such harm.
....
. . . Whatever the label applied, an approach focused solely on the welfare of
downstream purchasers or final consumers is inconsistent with the case law.
Id. at 2080 (footnotes omitted); see also Marius Schwartz, Professor, Georgetown Univ., Should Antitrust
Assess Buyer Market Power Differently than Seller Market Power?, Comments at the DOJ/FTC
Workshop on Merger Enforcement 1 (Feb. 17, 2004) (transcript available with the Georgia State Law
Review) (“[T]he term ‘consumers’ is, in my view, a metaphor for ‘trading partners’—be they buyers of
the merging firms’ products or sellers of inputs to them. A merger that increases market power and enables
the merged firm to impose worse terms on its trading partners is equally objectionable if the trading
partners in question are suppliers to, or buyers from, that firm.”).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol38/iss4/10
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Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. United States.19 Delivering the
Court’s opinion, Justice Brandeis explained:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is
such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition. To determine that question the court
must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to
which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its
effect, actual or probable. 20
The Court described nine ways in which the restraint at issue “helped
to improve market conditions”; each of these reflected the Court’s
limitation of procompetitive effects to the same market in which the
restraint occurred.21
Leaning on this precedent, United States v. Topco Associates
illuminated the rule-of-reason analysis and discarded the logic of
attempting to balance cross-market economic harms.22 Indeed, Justice
Marshall’s opinion exhibited exemplary foresight in preemptively
foreclosing precisely the type of “consumer demand” argument that
the NCAA has offered in defense of its anticompetitive restraint in the
labor market for college athletes:
Our inability to weigh, in any meaningful sense, destruction
of competition in one sector of the economy against
promotion of competition in another sector is one important
reason we have formulated per se rules.

19. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 240–41.
22. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). The per se rule condemns
anticompetitive conduct by virtue of its existence, without further inquiry into the existence of market
power. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (“There are certain agreements or
practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise
harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use.”).
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....
. . . [T]he freedom guaranteed each and every business, no
matter how small, is the freedom to compete—to assert with
vigor, imagination, devotion, and ingenuity whatever
economic muscle it can muster. Implicit in such freedom is
the notion that it cannot be foreclosed with respect to one
sector of the economy because certain private citizens or
groups believe that such foreclosure might promote greater
competition in a more important sector of the economy.23
Notably, the Topco Court cited precedent in United States v.
Philadelphia National Bank, and in doing so, the Court underscored
the nexus between antitrust aims in merger and conduct cases. 24 The
current divergent treatment of offsets in antitrust law in merger and
monopolization cases exaggerates the distinction between these two
sources of injury to competition. With some recent exceptions, such as
the T-Mobile–Sprint merger, 25 treatment in merger cases generally
rejects offsetting harms in the relevant market with some exogenously
derived justifications.26
Nonetheless, this prohibition has not dissuaded defense experts
from arrogating to themselves the determination of antitrust’s ambit
and attempting to use merger litigation as a petri dish to concoct new
justifications for anticompetitive conduct, regardless of their clear
incongruity with either judicial precedent or welfare economics. The

23. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. at 609, 610.
24. Id. at 610; United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963) (noting a bank merger is
not appropriate even when it would bring business and stimulate economy).
25. Here the U.S. Department of Justice disavowed their obligation to enforce the antitrust laws and
sided with the merging parties, embracing the claimed efficiency of faster 5G deployment in rural areas,
despite the harms to consumers of prepaid services in urban areas. Statement of Interest of the United
States of America at 2, New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG, 439 F. Supp. 3d 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (No.
19-cv-5434), 2019 WL 8403069 (“Specifically, T-Mobile has committed to providing 5G coverage to
85% of the rural population within three years, and 90% of the rural population within six years.”).
26. See Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 371 (“[A] merger the effect of which ‘may be substantially to
lessen competition’ is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits and
credits, it may be deemed beneficial.”).
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consumer demand offset used to justify the NCAA cartel’s restraint
reveals the same tortured logic as the one attributed to the merging
parties’ expert in a failed wireless merger—balancing the harm to
consumers from higher prices for telephone services against benefits
to shareholders from an increase in the price of the company’s stock27
(a logic that Topco expressly rejected). Certainly, this argument
generates obvious inequality-exacerbating effects, and it requires
extraordinary logical gymnastics to even attempt to reconcile it with
the intent of antitrust policy. As we explain, the consumer demand
offset that currently functions as the NCAA’s sole foundational
support under antitrust law rests on even less stable sand, although the
permissive legal environment flowing from the Board of Regents dicta
has permitted it to survive consecutive losses in O’Bannon and
Alston.28
Although economic logic militates against the use of consumer
demand offsets in antitrust enforcement generally, these cases reveal
that balancing the harm to one party against a claimed benefit to
another has found somewhat more fertile ground in defending
Section 1 claims under the Sherman Antitrust Act. 29 The disparate
treatment of this justification in conduct versus merger cases remains
despite receiving little support. As even Chicago School luminary,
Ward Bowman, acknowledged well over half a century ago:
The merger case is not essentially different from the cartel

27. Jesse Eisinger & Justin Elliott, These Professors Make More Than a Thousand Bucks an Hour
Peddling Mega-Mergers, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/theseprofessors-make-more-than-thousand-bucks-hour-peddling-mega-mergers
[https://perma.cc/BRW59XVB]. One economist consulting on antitrust litigation wanted to test a provocative new offset theory at
trial:
[Dennis] Carlton conceded that AT&T and T-Mobile would have found it hard to
win at trial, according to an attendee. But he wished it had gone to court. He was
eager to try out a new and provocative argument for mergers: That even though
prices would have risen for customers, the companies would have achieved large
cost savings. The gain for AT&T shareholders, he contended, would have justified
the merger, even if cell phone customers lost out.
Id.
28. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984); O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049,
1063–64 (9th Cir. 2015); NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2158(2021) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
29. See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1064–66; see also Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2159–60.
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case which is so generally disparaged. In fact, it is likely to
be worse. Mergers allow less freedom for independent action
than do cartels, are less limited in the amount of monopoly
power they can exercise, and represent much more
permanent forms of organization.30
Judge Learned Hand’s seminal opinion in United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America likewise explained the economically substantive
parallels between unilateral and collusive exercise of market power. 31
If merger cases have properly ignored such offsets, permitting conduct
cases to do so implies a distinction in regulatory objective where none
exists. After all, antitrust claims brought under the Clayton Antitrust
Act and Sherman Act have a singular central purpose: to protect
competition and to disperse economic power.32 Why permit one type
of anticompetitive conduct to benefit from specious defenses generally

30. Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Toward Less Monopoly, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 577, 640 (1953); see also
ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 165 (1978) (“Indeed, once
efficiency is ignored, there appears to be no difference between a cartel and a company. They both
eliminate competition internally.”).
31. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427–28 (2d Cir. 1945). Judge Hand argues
that the distinction between true monopoly and collusive power is merely formal:
Starting, however, with the authoritative premise that all contracts fixing prices are
unconditionally prohibited, the only possible difference between them and a
monopoly is that while a monopoly necessarily involves an equal, or even greater,
power to fix prices, its mere existence might be thought not to constitute an exercise
of that power. That distinction is nevertheless purely formal; it would be valid only
so long as the monopoly remained wholly inert; it would disappear as soon as the
monopoly began to operate; for, when it did—that is, as soon as it began to sell at
all—it must sell at some price and the only price at which it could sell is a price
which it itself fixed. Thereafter the power and its exercise must needs coalesce.
Indeed it would be absurd to condemn such contracts unconditionally, and not to
extend the condemnation to monopolies; for the contracts are only steps toward that
entire control which monopoly confers: they are really partial monopolies.
Id.
32. Nat’l Soc’y of Pro. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978). The Sherman Act is at the
center of the free market economy. Id. (“The Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately
competition will produce not only lower prices[] but also better goods and services. . . . The assumption
that competition is the best method of allocating resources in a free market recognizes that all elements of
a bargain—quality, service, safety, and durability—and not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected
by the free opportunity to select among alternative offers.”); see also Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S.
231, 248 (1951) (“The heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the value of
competition.”).
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condemned under another? 33 One cannot but acknowledge the irony of
labeling collusion as the apex of anticompetitive conduct when
juxtaposed against the NCAA cartel’s continued existence. Indeed, not
only does its members’ collusive restraint against athlete
compensation endure but it does so based on a single defense: the
claim that the restraint preserves consumer demand for the product in
the output market (sporting events), thus offsetting the direct evidence
of harm to athlete labor in the input market. The offset defense in
conduct cases also runs afoul of precedent in Philadelphia National
Bank in which the Court correctly noted that balancing harms and
benefits across groups is the proper domain of the legislative branch,
not the judiciary.34
Although both merger and conduct cases adjudicated under the rule
of reason acknowledge netting intragroup effects, NCAA litigation has
acknowledged intergroup offsets. Specifically, as we detail herein,
Board of Regents opened the door to offsetting harms to athlete labor
in the input market with claimed demand-enhancing benefits to
downstream viewers of the sporting events produced in the output
market.35

33. We expect some may argue that, rather than prohibiting intergroup offsets in both merger and
conduct cases, both should permit them under certain conditions. But, as we explain herein, this is no
more persuasive than claiming that two wrongs must make a right.
34. See United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 346–348 (1963).
35. Hemphill and Rose proffer the term “trading partner” to identify the target of harms and potential
offsetting benefits. See Hemphill & Rose, supra note 18, at 2080. The NCAA operates in both output and
input markets; both athlete labor and downstream consumers can be considered “trading partners” in these
respective markets. To avoid confusion and to maintain consistency with our prescription of a prohibition
on balancing across groups, we employ the terms intergroup and intragroup instead, defined in Part I.A.
See supra Part I.A. Formal definitions aside, we concur with Hemphill and Rose in our disagreement
“with commentators who would confine antitrust enforcement to conduct with demonstrated output
market harms.” Hemphill & Rose, supra note 18, at 2080.
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B. Board of Regents, Alston, and Broadening American Express
Beyond Transactional Platforms
The overlooked effect of Board of Regents lies in its effective
broadening of American Express beyond transactional platforms by
permitting the same arguments to materialize at step two of the rule of
reason; Alston, by virtue of its limited scope, failed to cauterize this
very wound.36 In American Express, the Court defined the relevant
market in step one of the rule of reason as “two-sided,” encompassing
two groups (merchants and consumers) and permitted benefits to the
latter to offset harms to merchants flowing from American Express’s
anti-steering provision. 37 Of course, to the extent the restraint
prevented merchants from using discounts from standard prices to
steer cardholders to lower-cost payment platforms, the anti-steering
provisions also harmed cardholders by causing prices in the goods
markets to be artificially inflated. The Court mistook rising
transactions on American Express’s platform as proof of the lack of
output effects when the proper counterfactual was whether
transactions would have been even higher in the absence of the
restraints (i.e., the “but-for” condition)—a requirement satisfied to the
extent cardholders’ demand for items purchased with the card is
downward sloping in the items’ price.38
Balancing occurred by eliding the two groups—merchants and
consumers—within the same relevant two-sided market. 39 But
American Express distinguished transaction platforms, such as credit
card networks, which are characterized by indirect network effects
from traditional markets. 40 For example, the Court argued that the
36. See generally NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021).
37. We use the term “group” instead of “market” (e.g., cross-market balancing or market specificity)
because it more accurately describes the recipient of both antitrust harm and procompetitive benefit,
particularly in light of Supreme Court rulings in American Express and the NCAA litigation.
38. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2302 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“But the relevant
restriction of output is as compared with a hypothetical world in which the restraint was not present and
prices were lower.”).
39. See id. at 2276–77.
40. Id. at 2280 (“Two-sided platforms differ from traditional markets in important ways. Most relevant
here, two-sided platforms often exhibit what economists call ‘indirect network effects.’ Indirect network
effects exist where the value of the two-sided platform to one group of participants depends on how many
members of a different group participate.” (citations omitted)).
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relationship between advertisers, newspapers, and readers should be
treated as single-sided given the lack of these indirect network effects
between advertisers and consumers. 41 But distinction matters little if
the judicial review permits balancing harmful and potentially
beneficial effects of a restraint across markets in step two. In that case,
labeling a platform as “transactional” and evaluating “indirect network
effects” only serves to determine whether the offsets should be
credited at step one or step two—a more formalistic than substantive
distinction. Indeed, to the extent that the Supreme Court intended
American Express to cabin its multi-sided prescription to transactional
platforms, the NCAA litigation trampled over any such boundary,
further departing from the Supreme Court’s precedent in
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States. 42 By permitting
consumer demand to countervail labor harms—an offset that
transcends markets not merely groups—the NCAA litigation,
beginning with Board of Regents and culminating with the latest
decision in Alston, effectively advanced to step two of the rule of
reason, using the same market definition arguments properly
addressed at step one. 43 Indeed, immediately subsequent to the
American Express decision, the NCAA asked the court to reconsider
its expert’s multi-sided platform argument, which the court had
previously excluded as a result of the parties stipulating to the same
single-sided market definition as in O’Bannon. 44 Among his
non-exhaustive list of “sides” to the market, however, the NCAA’s
41. Id. at 2286.
42. See Times-Picayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 610 (1953) (noting that the
dominance of one of the two “separate though interdependent markets” was decisive).
43. For a detailed review of the arguments offered therein, see generally Ted Tatos, Relevant Market
Definition and Multi-Sided Platforms After Ohio v. American Express: Evidence from Recent NCAA
Antitrust Litigation, 10 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 147 (2019).
44. Order on Motions to Exclude Proposed Expert Testimony at 6, In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid
Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 14-md-02541) (“Any testimony Dr.
Elzinga gives regarding procompetitive benefits in his hypothetical multi-sided market is not relevant to
procompetitive effects in the relevant market.”); see also Expert Report of Kenneth Elzinga at 28 n.87, In
re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2019)
(No. 14-md-02541). In explaining that his list of sides to the platform is not exhaustive, Elzinga stated,
“Public fans of the university’s athletic teams are also a relevant constituency, as are broadcasters, who
in a fashion analogous [to] the description of magazines, operate a two-sided platform, themselves, serving
viewers (including public fans of the university’s teams) and the broadcaster’s advertisers.” Expert Report
of Kenneth Elzinga, supra.
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expert included “sports fans,” a clear nod to the consumer demand
offset that would go on to survive exclusion under Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 through a metamorphosis into a procompetitive
justification at step two of the rule of reason.45
Upon review, the Court again excluded the NCAA’s antitrust
expert’s opinion that both the NCAA and universities constitute
multi-sided platforms “as irrelevant in light of the Court’s summary
adjudication of market definition, and as unreliable, under Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert [v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.].”46 Notably, the Court cited the expert’s failure to “describe any
platform analogous to a two-sided transaction.”47 The Court’s ruling
was entirely consistent with American Express, yet simultaneously
ineffective at precluding the argument’s substance from advancing to
step two. 48 Indeed, the very same “consumer demand” argument
proffered in the relevant market definition that the Court excluded has
remained the sole claimed procompetitive justification for the restraint
against payments in the name of amateurism. 49 Antitrust defendants, it
appears, need not concern themselves if their attempt to broaden the
market through claimed multi-sidedness fails at step one; they can
recycle the very same arguments and present them at step two. Thus,
fears that the Supreme Court would expand its interpretation of
multi-sidedness beyond “transactional platforms” are now immaterial.
The permissive attitude toward intergroup procompetitive
justifications has already served that purpose, not only elevating the
burden on Plaintiffs but also undermining any nexus to economic
logic. We lay the blame for this confusion squarely on Board of
Regents, whose tentacles still permit the NCAA to choke competition
among buyers for intercollegiate athlete labor, a fact that Judge Smith
45. Expert Report of Kenneth Elzinga, supra note 44, at 102 (“In the face of these effects the
inexorable logic of mutual dependency of demand in multi-sided platforms cautions that the diminishing
effect of professionalizing intercollegiate sports would not be confined to athletes and sports fans, but its
full effects could be felt all across every college and university.”).
46. Order Reaffirming Exclusion of Certain Expert Testimony by Dr. Elzinga at 14, In re NCAA
Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (N.C. Cal. 2019) (No. 14-md-02541).
47. Id. at 13.
48. Compare Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2302 (2018), with In re NCAA Athletic
Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1070–1086.
49. See In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1070–1086.
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correctly illuminated in his Ninth Circuit Alston concurrence.50 In the
next Part, we explain how Board of Regents paved the way to the offset
confusion that pervades the antitrust status quo.51
II. THE CONSUMER DEMAND OFFSET IN NCAA ANTITRUST
LITIGATION
The Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Board of Regents bears
responsibility for sustaining “amateurism,” the vernacular’s anodyne
description of the NCAA’s collusive restraint; although, as irony
would have it, the Board of Regents Court found that the NCAA’s
television plan violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act.52 But the Court
declined to apply the per se rule and opted for the more relaxed
rule-of-reason standard instead, based on Judge Bork’s logic that some
activities require joint conduct for the product to exist (e.g., league
sports). 53 The same logic guided both the Seventh Circuit and the
Supreme Court in American Needle, Inc. v. NFL.54 The latter cited to
Board of Regents, and thus signaled its approval of Bork’s argument
in declaring that “[w]hen ‘restraints on competition are essential if the
product is to be available at all,’ per se rules of illegality are
inapplicable, and instead the restraint must be judged according to the
flexible Rule of Reason.”55 Therefore, the Court reasoned that when
some ancillary restraint(s) exist, then any challenged restraint, even if
not ancillary, must be adjudicated under the rule of reason.56
50. Alston v. NCAA (In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.), 958 F.3d 1239, 1266
(9th Cir. 2020) (Smith J., concurring), aff’d sub nom. NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021) (“I write
separately to express concern that the current state of our antitrust law reflects an unwitting expansion of
the Rule of Reason inquiry in a way that deprives the young athletes in this case (Student-Athletes) of the
fundamental protections that our antitrust laws were meant to provide them.”).
51. See infra Part II.
52. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
53. See BORK, supra note 30, at 435; see also Robert H. Bork, Ancillary Restraints and the Sherman
Act, 15 SECTION ANTITRUST L. 211, 227 (1959) (“[T]he sole function of the concept of ancillarity under
the Sherman Act should be to point out instances when per se illegality should not attach and to confine
the exceptions thus made to their proper scope.”).
54. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 203 (2010).
55. Id. (emphasis omitted).
56. Id. For a detailed look at the ancillary restraints doctrine, see generally Gregory J. Werden, The
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This argument significantly broadens the scope of restraints
required for a product and its concomitant efficiencies to exist. It also
represents a logical error that has insulated collusive conduct,
particularly in sports markets, from condemnation under the per se
rule. If—as Gregory Werden, a former Senior Economic Counsel at
the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division argues—defendants
have the burden of showing an ancillary restraint, but “that burden is
not a heavy one,” then the logic of Board of Regents lightens it even
further.57 Indeed, while Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines,
Inc. elevated output restraints as the nucleus of anticompetitive
conduct, Judge Wald’s concurring opinion therein signaled a need for
further instruction from the Supreme Court regarding the as-yet
unsettled debate over the ambit of antitrust laws. 58 That instruction
would come in Board of Regents; although, as we explain, it launched
antitrust into the very sea of doubt against which Judge Taft warned in
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.59
A. The Inductive Fallacy in Board of Regents’s Reasoning
Board of Regents’s logical error represents an example of an
inductive fallacy of the hasty generalization form. 60 To explain the
Ancillary Restraints Doctrine After Dagher, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 17 (2007), and see also Statement of
Interest of the United States of America at 24, Seaman v. Duke Univ., No. 15-cv-462 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 7,
2019), ECF No. 325 (“‘To be ancillary,’ an ‘agreement eliminating competition must be subordinate and
collateral to a separate, legitimate transaction,’ and reasonably necessary to ‘make the main transaction
more effective in accomplishing its purpose.’” (quoting Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines,
Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
57. Werden, supra note 56, at 24.
58. Rothery Storage & Van Co., 792 F.2d 210, 231 (Wald, J., concurring) (“I think it premature to
construct an antitrust test that ignores all other potential concerns of the antitrust laws except for restriction
of output and price raising.”).
59. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 284 (6th Cir. 1898). Judge Taft cautioned
against using a “shifting, vague, and indeterminate . . . standard”:
It is true that there are some cases in which the courts, mistaking, as we conceive,
the proper limits of the relaxation of the rules for determining the unreasonableness
of restraints of trade, have set sail on a sea of doubt, and have assumed the power
to say, in respect to contracts which have no other purpose and no other
consideration on either side than the mutual restraint of the parties, how much
restraint of competition is in the public interest, and how much is not.
Id. at 283–84.
60. This fallacy of relevance is commonly known as a “red herring fallacy.” See, e.g., JOHN WOODS,
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nature of this error, consider the NCAA case and suppose only three
agreements exist: (1) uniform numbers, (2) distance of the three-point
line, and (3) athlete compensation. Applied to this example, the logical
argument in Board of Regents and American Needle is as follows:
Premise 1: Agreements 1 and 2 require collusive agreement among
universities.
Premise 2: Agreements 1 and 2 are ancillary to the universities’
agreement not to pay athletes (Agreement 3).
Conclusion: Therefore, all three collusive agreements involved are
ancillary.
A Venn diagram provides a graphical representation of this
argument’s error. 61 The fallacy above concludes that the two
identically sized circles are concentric (i.e., share the same center and
thus lie on top of each other). Accepting this argument would mean
that all collusive restraints are ancillary.

Figure 1: Graphical Representation of the Logical Fallacy in
Board of Regents

THE DEATH OF AN ARGUMENT – FALLACIES IN AGENT BASED REASONING 311 (2004):
Hasty generalization is usually classified as an inductive fallacy.
....
. . . Aristotle discusses secundum quid in two places. In On Sophistical Refutations,
it is the fallacy of omitting a qualification, as in an argument which concludes that
Mr. Mandela is white from the [premise] that he is white-haired. An apparently
different conception is proposed in the Rhetoric, suggestive of the fallacy of hasty
generalization in the sense of a sampling error or a generalization drawn without
adequate inductive support.
Id. (citations omitted).
61. See infra Figure 1.
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The hasty generalization fallacy in Board of Regents and American
Needle highlights the error of inferring causation from correlation. The
third collusive restraint relating to athlete compensation is correlated
with the first two restraints because all are part of the concerted
agreement among members. Because the first two have a causal
connection to the product’s existence (i.e., the product could not exist
in their absence), the logical fallacy lies in inferring that the third
restraint must also share this causal relationship and thus the ancillary
status that would prompt treatment under the rule of reason.
Determination of whether a restraint is ancillary falls under the rubric
of causal inference, an observation that Professor Steven C. Salop at
Georgetown University Law Center and others have recently made in
proposing a “causal contingency” test62 to determine the legitimacy of
an offsetting justification that occurs outside the relevant market at
issue, an argument we address in Part III.63
Indeed, having acknowledged that some ancillary restraints are
needed for the enterprise to exist, nowhere did the Court in American
Needle signal its intent to cabin the scope of its opinion to those
meeting the needed-to-exist criterion—perhaps a reflection that Board

62. Steven C. Salop, Daniel Francis, Lauren Sillman & Michaela Spero, Rebuilding Platform
Antitrust: Moving on from Ohio v. American Express, GEO. U. L. CTR., October 2021, at 1, 51,
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/2414 [https://perma.cc/RWT7-5UXD].
63. See infra Part III.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol38/iss4/10

20

Tatos and Singer: The Abuse of Offsets as Procompetitive Justification

2022]

ABUSE OF OFFSETS AS PROCOMPETITIVE JUSTIFICATIONS

1199

of Regents did not proffer that distinction either.64 Even though it may
have relied on the Board of Regents’s explanation that “a certain
degree of cooperation is necessary” to sustain the product’s existence,
its erroneous treatment of ancillary restraints reflects a broad “if any
then all” logic.65 Whether the Court in Board of Regents and American
Needle intended this expansive definition of ancillary restraints is now
largely immaterial; in doing so, the Court opened the door for
defendants to argue ancillary status applies to any restraint, no matter
how peripheral (or even entirely untethered) to the product’s existence,
thus shifting adjudication to the rule of reason. 66 This represents a
fundamental ideological shift from the per se condemnation accorded
to collusive restraints of trade, as explained in both Board of Trade of
City of Chicago and United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.67
Demonstrating how one error can lead to another, this rule of reason
permitted the NCAA to claim that its restraint on athlete compensation
promotes competition by increasing consumer demand, thus offsetting
any harms it may cause. 68 As a result, Board of Regents laid the
groundwork for judicial acknowledgment of consumer demand for
intercollegiate athletics as a potential offset for worker harms, even
though that offset did not take the form of lower prices, higher output,
or improved quality. 69 It argued that the NCAA’s actions widen
consumer choice by offering sports fans a product distinguishable from
professional sports by a nexus (however illusory) to academics. 70 The
Court further added that preservation of this distinction meant that

64. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 186–204 (2010).
65. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 117 (1984); Am. Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. at 203.
66. Notably, neither Board of Regents nor American Needle addressed issues related to the input
market for labor. The challenged conduct in both cases dealt with restrictions in the output product
markets; the former covered NCAA restrictions on television rights and the latter licenses for vendors to
manufacture and sell NFL team-labeled apparel. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 94–95; Am. Needle, Inc.,
560 U.S. at 187. The Court in both cases declined to apply the per se rule that governs naked price-fixing
restraints and opted for the “quick-look” rule of reason instead. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100, 109
n.39; see also Am. Needle, Inc., 560 U.S. at 203.
67. See Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); see also United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 401 (1927).
68. See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120–21.
69. See id. at 102.
70. See id.
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college “athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend class,
and the like.”71
The district court in O’Bannon correctly recognized that the Board
of Regents decision “addressed limits on television broadcasting, not
payments to student-athletes,” 72 and it interpreted the Board of
Regents’s “incidental phrase” consistently with the Supreme Court’s
later clarification in Alston.73 Nonetheless, bound by Board of Regents
precedent, the O’Bannon district court explained:
[S]ome restrictions on compensation may still serve a
limited procompetitive purpose if they are necessary to
maintain the popularity of FBS football and Division I
basketball. If the challenged restraints actually play a
substantial role in maximizing consumer demand for the
NCAA’s products—specifically, FBS football and
Division I basketball telecasts, re-broadcasts, ticket sales,
and merchandise—then the restrictions would be
procompetitive.74
Although the Court disregarded the NCAA’s consumer-demand
survey as unpersuasive and riddled with methodological flaws, it
nonetheless permitted the justification of harm to athlete labor by some
undefined means of maintaining or enhancing the popularity of
intercollegiate athletics—paradoxically, a product defined by the very

71. Id.
72. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 999 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d in part, vacated in part,
O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). In NCAA v. Alston, the Court clarified the nature of
the restraint at issue in both cases, dismissing Board of Regents’s reference to athlete compensation as a
“passing comment.” NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2146 (2021). The Alston Court explained:
The Court in Board of Regents did not analyze the lawfulness of the NCAA’s
restrictions on student-athlete compensation. Rather, that case involved an antitrust
challenge to the NCAA’s restraints on televising games—an antitrust challenge the
Court sustained. Along the way, the Court commented on the NCAA’s critical role
in maintaining the revered tradition of amateurism in college sports as one “entirely
consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act.” But that sort of passing comment on
an issue not presented is not binding, nor is it dispositive here.
Id. (citations omitted)
73. See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1000; see also Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2158.
74. O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1000.
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restraint it imposed on labor wages. 75 Like Board of Regents, the
O’Bannon district court’s decision did not point to cognizable
economic efficiencies such as lower prices or improved quality. 76 In
doing so, the district court’s interpretation of Board of Regents left
open the possibility that any driver of consumer demand, regardless of
its motivation, could serve as a procompetitive justification. 77 But
these justifications refer to economic efficiencies that improve
competition, not those that may assuage potential preference of athlete
exploitation or those potentially motivated by racial animus.78
B. The Specter of Board of Regents Haunts the O’Bannon and
Alston Decisions
The district court’s reasoning in O’Bannon reverberated through
subsequent decisions. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit concurred with the
lower court’s interpretation of Board of Regents’s “long encomium to
amateurism” found at the conclusion of the Supreme Court’s Board of
Regents opinion as dicta.79 Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit accepted the
district court’s finding that “the NCAA’s current rules serve a
procompetitive benefit by promoting this understanding of
amateurism, which in turn helps preserve consumer demand for
college sports” and advanced to step two under the rule of reason.80
Signaling its asymmetric view of anticompetitive harms and
procompetitive justifications, the Ninth Circuit titled the headings
75. In his concurring opinion in Alston, Justice Kavanaugh dismissed the Board of Regents Court’s
reasoning, noting:
Nowhere else in America can businesses get away with agreeing not to pay their
workers a fair market rate on the theory that their product is defined by not paying
their workers a fair market rate. And under ordinary principles of antitrust law, it
is not evident why college sports should be any different. The NCAA is not above
the law.
Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2169 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
76. See generally O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
77. Id. at 1000 (“‘[M]aximiz[ing] consumer demand for the product’ is a legitimate procompetitive
justification.” (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984))).
78. Ted Tatos & Hal Singer, Antitrust Anachronism: The Interracial Wealth Transfer in Collegiate
Athletics Under the Consumer Welfare Standard, 66 ANTITRUST BULL. 396, 429 (2021).
79. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1063 (9th Cir. 2015).
80. Id. at 1059, 1076 (“Both we and the district court agree that the NCAA’s amateurism rule has
procompetitive benefits.”).
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discussing harms and efficiencies as “Significant Anticompetitive
Effects Within a Relevant Market” and “Procompetitive Effects,”
respectively.81 As indicated and consistent with its acceptance of the
district court’s ruling, it did not cabin its analysis of procompetitive
effects to either the same group or the same relevant market in which
the anticompetitive conduct occurred. 82 In short, the Ninth Circuit
accepted the claim that “the amateur nature of collegiate sports
increases their appeal to consumers.” 83 Yet it reversed the district
court’s prescription of a $5,000 cash payment to athletes as a less
restrictive alternative to achieving this offset, finding that “the district
court clearly erred in finding it a viable alternative to allow students to
receive NIL cash payments untethered to their education expenses.”84
This finding laid the foundation for the Alston case, which, in an
attempt to fit within the narrow confines of the Ninth Circuit’s
O’Bannon precedent, challenged the NCAA’s collusive restraint on
educationally related compensation for football and basketball
players.85
Alston trods much of the same ground previously covered by the
Ninth Circuit O’Bannon case, both cases initially falling under the
purview of Judge Wilken in the Northern District of California.
Following the rule-of-reason prescription set forth in the Board of
Regents and O’Bannon precedents, the district court in Alston found
the relevant market to be elite NCAA football and basketball.86 The
district court again found that universities organized by the NCAA
81. Id. at 1070–1074.
82. See id. at 1072–73 (noting that amateurism not only increases consumer demand for college sports
but also increases choice for student-athletes).
83. Id. at 1073.
84. Id. at 1076, 1079.
85. NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2169 (2021).
86. In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1070 (N.D. Cal.
2019), aff’d sub nom. Alston v. NCAA (In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.), 958 F.3d
1239, 1266 (9th Cir. 2020). The court reasoned:
[T]he NCAA’s Division I essentially is the relevant market for elite college football
and basketball. And, because elite student-athletes lack any viable alternatives to
Division I, they are forced to accept, to the extent they want to attend college and
play sports at an elite level after high school, whatever compensation is offered to
them by Division I schools, regardless of whether any such compensation is an
accurate reflection of the competitive value of their athletic services.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
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exercised monopsony power over athlete labor, with the opinion
reflecting the definition of exploitation as restricting compensation
below marginal revenue product.87 And it yielded the same obvious
conclusion: that the NCAA’s challenged conduct has severe
anticompetitive effects and harms athletes in the relevant labor
market.88 Indeed, even the NCAA’s own expert, Nobel Laureate James
Heckman admitted that college athletes would be “clearly better off”
absent the collusive restraint preventing them from receiving such
money. 89 At this point, one might rightfully exclaim quod erat
demonstradum and expect that the restraint would be surely declared
per se unlawful without any further inquiry, particularly given the
Trinko Court’s “supreme evil of antitrust” condemnation of
collusion.90
Alas, no. Ever open to equivocation even in the face of the most
direct evidence of harm, the consumer welfare standard can seemingly
tolerate even “supreme evil” as long as a set of consumers can possibly
derive some nebulous benefit from the harm to another group,
including the labor that produces the very product. The well-worn
aphorism attributed to Zachariah Chaffee’s writings in the Harvard
Law Review observed, “Your right to swing your arms ends just where
the other man’s nose begins.” 91 Not so in the NCAA antitrust
litigation, which deemed the protection of labor’s noses as insufficient
justification to constrain the choice of consumers to swing their arms
87. Id. (“Moreover, the compensation that class members receive under the challenged rules is not
commensurate with the value that they create for Division I basketball and FBS football; this value is
reflected in the extraordinary revenues that Defendants derive from these sports.”).
88. Id.
89. Transcript of Dr. James Heckman at 597, In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.,
375 F. Supp. 3d. 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 14-md-02541) (“Clearly, if you just give the student alone
the money, just give the student another dollar, another penny, another $10,000 and you don’t account for
what could be large systematic adjustments if everybody gets those, then the student is clearly better off.
No question about it.”); see also In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d.
at 1084 (“Dr. Heckman also conceded that additional compensation could improve outcomes for
student-athletes, which contradicts the notion that the challenged compensation limits have a positive
effect on student-athlete outcomes.”).
90. Verizon Commc’ns. Inc. v. Law Offs. of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 408 (2004).
91. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 957 (1919). The
aphorism has a rather long history prior to Chaffee. See generally Your Liberty To Swing Your Fist Ends
Just Where My Nose Begins, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR, https://quoteinvestigator.com/2011/10/15/libertyfist-nose/ [https://perma.cc/4F7S-6YFL].
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at will. Indeed, even the limited scope of antitrust favored by the New
Learning offshoot of the Old Chicago School has become too
restrictive under the increasingly permissive standards. 92 Consistent
with adjudication under the rule of reason, the burden of proof at the
district court level then shifted to the NCAA to show any
procompetitive efficiencies that justify the harm to competition caused
by its restraint.93 In response, the NCAA abandoned the majority of its
procompetitive justifications, focusing only on the two that the district
court accepted in O’Bannon, albeit only in part: (1) “amateurism” as a
driver of consumer demand and (2) the integration of athletics and
academics.94 In its opinion, the district court dismissed the NCAA’s
second justification, pointing out, inter alia, that the vast athletic
facilities that universities erect on campus already serve to create a
“wedge” between athletes and their non-athlete peers. 95 Thus,
consumer demand, an intergroup offset and one occurring across
distinct antitrust markets (input and output markets), remained as the
singular pillar insulating NCAA “amateurism” from condemnation
under antitrust law.
On appeal, Judge Smith’s concurring opinion underscored the
limited victory that labor achieved by the district court in Alston,
explaining that, “[a]lthough the district court correctly applied our
precedents, the result of this analysis seems to erode the very
protections a Sherman Act plaintiff has the right to enforce. Here,
Student-Athletes are quite clearly deprived of the fair value of their
services.”96 Thus, we argue that consumer demand should have never
been considered as an offset for direct evidence of harm to athlete labor
in NCAA litigation. That the district court ultimately found this
evidence as unpersuasive is of small comfort, as Judge Smith

92. Walter Adams, James W. Brock & Norman P. Obst, Pareto Optimality and Antitrust Policy: The
Old Chicago and the New Learning, 58 S. ECON. J., July 1991, at 1, 6 (stating that, for the New Learning
school, “the only legitimate concern of antitrust should be blatant, garden variety price-fixing”).
93. In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d at 1096.
94. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1072 (9th Cir. 2015).
95. See In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d. at 1103.
96. Alston v. NCAA (In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.), 958 F.3d 1239, 1270
(9th Cir. 2020) (Smith, J., concurring), aff’d sub nom. NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021).
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observed. 97 Moreover, it highlights a critical flaw in the reasoning
behind intergroup balancing: if fostering demand in Group B justifies
the restraint on Group A, then, in the absence of the restraint, would
antitrust permit a claim by Group B on the basis that it was harmed by
the lack of restraint on Group A? If consumer demand considerations
justify a collusive restraint on athlete compensation, then could
consumers bring suit, for example, on the basis that relaxation of the
restraint on NIL compensation has harmed their enjoyment of the
sport? If so, this would represent a gross perversion of antitrust laws,
signaling that, if one’s free market enjoyment encumbers another’s
preferences for a restraint on others, antitrust injury would occur. If the
court does not recognize this absurdity (which it should not, of course),
then why permit it in the reverse? Why allow the restraint on the basis
that it fulfills another groups’ preference for seeing it imposed on
others?
As such, we argue that the Supreme Court missed a significant
opportunity to issue a broader ruling that would preclude defendants
in wage-fixing or single-firm monopsony litigation from launching
into NCAA-style fishing expeditions to find any nebulous consumer
benefits that could offset worker harm in rule-of-reason cases. By
failing to avail itself of the opportunity to condemn intergroup offsets,
the Supreme Court has permitted the amateurism restraint to survive.
As we explain below, antitrust law’s anemic response in the face of
clear and convincing direct evidence of harm to workers calls for a
realignment of judicial interpretation with the statutory goals of
protecting competition in both consumer and labor markets. 98
III. HOW ANTITRUST LAW SHOULD TREAT OFFSETS
Both economic scholarship and legal precedent recognize that the
benefits of a procompetitive justification should not accrue to the same
party that unreasonably restrains trade to the detriment of another
group. The Tenth Circuit in Law v. NCAA specifically precluded cost
97. Id.
98. See infra Part III.
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savings to the NCAA as a justification for its restraint on college coach
compensation.99 Economic efficiencies exclude pecuniary savings that
accrue to the party that exercises market power to restrain trade. 100 The
restraining party will always benefit from the anticompetitive conduct;
otherwise, it would not engage in it and risk violating antitrust laws.
Further, we argue that an economic logic does not support elevating
the welfare of the consumer above that of the worker. Likewise, parties
to no-poach agreements accrue financial benefits from the restraint,
such as cost savings arising from restraining competition for worker
wages, yet self-serving justifications do not enhance competition, thus
precluding their consideration as offsets under the rule of reason.101
A. Benefits Offsetting Harms Should Accrue to the Injured Group
Economic logic prescribes that the procompetitive benefit should
accrue to the party that suffered the injury from the restraint.102 Indeed,
this logic forms the basis for claims of merger “efficiencies,” arguing
that although the merger may reduce the number of competitors in an
output market, the merged entity will ultimately reduce its marginal
costs and pass along those savings to downstream consumers of the
99. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1023 (10th Cir. 1998). The Tenth Circuit issued the somewhat
confusing opinion that “[w]hile increasing output, creating operating efficiencies, making a new product
available, enhancing product or service quality, and widening consumer choice have been accepted by
courts as justifications for otherwise anticompetitive agreements, mere profitability or cost savings have
not qualified as a defense under the antitrust laws.” Id. Operating (also known as “operational”) efficiency
includes cost savings, which the court correctly precluded from representing a procompetitive
justification. See id. In doing so, the court implicitly distinguished between operating efficiencies that
flow from cost savings that are passed on to customers through lower (competitive) prices and cost savings
that simply result in higher margins for the restraining firm. See id.
100. See Nancy L. Rose & Jonathan Sallet, The Dichotomous Treatment of Efficiencies in Horizontal
Mergers: Too Much? Too Little? Getting it Right, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 1941, 1958 (2020) (“Economic
efficiencies are distinguished from purely financial gains by excluding pecuniary effects, and specifically
excluding cost reductions that accrue from an increase of market power.”).
101. Donald J. Polden, Restraints on Workers’ Wages and Mobility: No-Poach Agreements and the
Antitrust Laws, 59 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 579, 602 (2020) (“The clear purpose and effect of both no-hire
and no-poach agreements—whether in the franchise context or in the independent or unrelated competitor
context—is to restrict employee mobility and compensation for purposes of reducing the employers’ costs
by paying the employees less.”); see also Statement of Interest of the United States of America, supra
note 56, at 22 (explaining that “no-poach agreements between competing employers have almost identical
anticompetitive effects to wage-fixing agreements: they enable the employers to avoid competing over
wages and other terms of employment offered to the affected employees”).
102. This same logic reflects the aim of economic damages to place the injured party in the same
position that the party would have occupied had the harmful event not occurred.
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product(s) at issue.103 Judge Smith’s concurring opinion in the Ninth
Circuit’s Alston case succinctly and accurately described the error in
ignoring this reasoning:
If the purpose of the Rule of Reason is to determine whether
a restraint is net procompetitive or net anticompetitive,
accepting procompetitive effects in a collateral market
disrupts that balancing. It weakens antitrust protections by
permitting defendants to rely on a broader array of
justifications that promote competition, if at all, in collateral
markets where the restraint under analysis does not occur.
....
. . . Under the Rule of Reason analysis we affirm today, so
long as the NCAA cites consumer demand for college sports,
we allow it to artificially suppress competition for collegiate
athletes’ services by limiting their compensation. Instead of
requiring the NCAA to explain how those limits promote
schools’ competition for athletes, we leave Student-Athletes
with little recourse under the antitrust laws.
....
Our Rule of Reason framework has shifted toward this
cross-market analysis without direct consideration or a
robust justification.104
He then queried whether “scholars or litigants can develop a purely
economic, mathematically[] defensible method for cross-market
analysis that does not depend on policy judgments that our antitrust

103. Whether such claimed efficiencies have manifested themselves in reality is a topic outside the
scope of this Article.
104. Alston v. NCAA (In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.), 958 F.3d 1239,
1269–71 (9th Cir. 2020) (Smith, J., concurring), aff’d sub nom. NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021).
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laws never meant to delegate to the courts.” 105 We answer Judge
Smith’s proposition here: no purely economic and mathematically
defensible method exists. Offsets that accrue to a group different than
the one harmed depend on normative, not positive judgments. These
assessments necessarily involve moral and ethical considerations that
cannot be expressed in purely mathematical terms; they reflect the
values that society seeks to promote. The field of economics has
wrestled with this issue for the better part of three centuries—since
Jeremy Bentham formulated the theory of utilitarianism. Indeed, if a
simple mathematical formula could achieve this goal, then one would
have certainly expected the NCAA, with its vast resources and army
of highly credentialed expert economists at its service, to have at least
proffered a plausible attempt at doing so. Yet even the expert opinions
that survived exclusion offered nothing of the sort. 106 A decision to
justify harms to college athlete labor, by claiming that it satisfies the
consumer audience’s taste for this level of exploitation, requires a
value judgment that cannot be defended on empirically quantifiable
grounds.
An exegesis of utility theory lies beyond the scope of this Article;
fortunately, the economic issues here do not require it. Economists
have long recognized that interpersonal comparisons of utility result in
flawed judgments on both empirical and ethical grounds, a result
plainly demonstrated by attempts to do so in NCAA antitrust
litigation.107 As British economist Lionel Robbins explained in 1938:
105. Id. at 1271.
106. Not only did economic expert evidence not provide an argument of this sort but Wisconsin
Chancellor and former economics professor, Rebecca Blank, also testified in the Alston trial that
Wisconsin did not perform any survey of the impact on fan willingness to watch football if conferences
were free to set their own rules. Transcript of Record at 898–99, In re Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust
Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (2019) (No. 14-MD-2541).
107. For a detailed discussion of interpersonal comparisons of utility, see generally Peter J. Hammond,
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: Why and How They Are and Should be Made (European Univ. Inst.,
Working Paper
No. 90/3, 1990), https://homepages.warwick.ac.uk/~ecsgaj/icuSurvey.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BW22-XHRQ]. Hammond argues that utility comparisons come down to value
judgements:
The paper discusses reasons why interpersonal comparisons of utility (ICU’s) have
been eschewed in the past and argues that most existing approaches, both empirical
and ethical, to ICU’s are flawed. Either they confound facts with values, or they

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol38/iss4/10

30

Tatos and Singer: The Abuse of Offsets as Procompetitive Justification

2022]

ABUSE OF OFFSETS AS PROCOMPETITIVE JUSTIFICATIONS

1209

I still cannot believe that it is helpful to speak as if
interpersonal comparisons of utility rest upon scientific
foundations—that
is,
upon
observation
or
introspection. . . . I still think, when I make interpersonal
comparisons (as, for instance, when I am deciding between
claims affecting the satisfactions of two very spirited
children), that my judgments are more like judgments of
value than judgments of verifiable fact. 108
By claiming that benefits to consumers justify harms to athlete labor,
this litigation attempted to expand the already economically inapposite
comparisons across groups, not just across individuals. As far as
intragroup comparisons are concerned, we can attempt to proxy the
effect of the restraint by aggregating the dollar difference in
compensation between the actual and the counterfactual. This
approach requires no value judgment regarding whether one dollar to
Athlete A is worth more than a dollar to Athlete B. It simply reflects
the total dollar value of the damages suffered by the group.
We expect that the counterargument would immediately posit that
the same dollar-value analysis lends itself to a mathematical
comparison across groups. Suppose that a defendant decided to
distribute to the second group some of the profits it garnered from
imposition of the restraint on the first group. For example, suppose that
the NCAA could show that the ticket prices fans must pay to attend
games would be higher absent amateurism, thus depressing demand.
In that case, we expect that the NCAA’s expert would calculate the
are based on unrealistic hypothetical decisions in an “original position”. Instead
ICU’s need to be recognized for what they really are — preferences for different
kinds of people.
....
. . . [E]thically relevant ICU’s are tantamount to normative statements and so
cannot be derived just from empirical observation.
Id. at 1, 5; see also Daniel M. Hausman, The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons, 104
MIND 473, 475 (1995) (“Most economists believe that interpersonal comparisons of utility are untestable,
evaluative or even meaningless. In his classic defense of these conclusions, Lionel Robbins argues that
evidence for preference rankings is introspective and thus unavailable when comparing the preferences of
different individuals.”).
108. Lionel Robbins, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment, 48 ECON. J. 635, 640 (1938).
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demand elasticity for sporting contests and thus estimate the dollar
impact of the restraint’s removal on the consumer group (i.e., the
output market). Continuing our extreme example of balancing through
readily quantifiable effects, the expert would compare the dollar value
of the demand effect against the dollar value of the restraint on the
input side.
This superficial calculation relies on a veneer of mathematical
precision that belies its counterintuitive and socially regressive
ramifications. The problem lies in the fact that the dollar comparison
reflects a cardinal representation of utility. But this ignores the concept
of diminishing marginal utility. Suppose we applied the same logic in
merger cases and the price appreciation from the merger of two major
energy firms resulted in a higher financial benefit to stockholders than
the concomitant financial harm to consumers through higher fuel
prices. Permitting the merger based on the accounting of these offsets
would ignore its regressive effects. Ten percent of Americans own
nearly 90% of all stock.109 Thus, acknowledgment of such intergroup
offsets would benefit the highest earners by harming the general
population of consumers. Alternating the metric from dollars to
individuals offers no solution. This policy would tend to benefit the
majority to the detriment of socially protected groups. Indeed, this is
the very effect of the NCAA restraint—it has justified harms to
primarily Black athletes on the basis of benefits to primarily White
constituencies. 110 If the goal of antitrust enforcement were to
implement a regressive policy that counteracts the social welfare and
fosters the interracial transfer of wealth, permitting such intergroup
offsets appears to be an effective way to go about it.
B. Compromise View: The Burden Should Be on Defendants to
109. Juliana Kaplan & Andy Kiersz, The Wealthiest Americans Now Own Almost All of the Stock
Market — 89% to be Exact, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 19, 2021, 11:53 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/wealthiest-americans-now-own-record-high-share-of-stocks-2021-10
[https://perma.cc/2F96-MRNP].
110. Tatos & Singer, supra note 78; see also Nathan Kalman-Lamb, Derek Silva & Johanna Mellis, ‘I
Signed My Life to Rich White Guys’: Athletes on the Racial Dynamics of College Sports, GUARDIAN (Mar.
17, 2021, 5:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2021/mar/17/college-sports-racial-dynamics
[https://perma.cc/TZY6-WNXC].
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Prove the Offset Is Not Possible Absent the Restraint and to
Quantify the Magnitude of the Offset
Some antitrust scholars have proffered various limitations on the
nature of intergroup offsets. Professor Daniel A. Crane at University
of Michigan Law School argues that “a presumption against balancing
effects across market[s]” (the “market specificity rule”) can be
rebutted using “compelling evidence” in certain cases. 111 Professor
Crane further claims that “it is far from inevitable that deviating from
the market-specificity rule would require such balancing.”112 But, if
anything, the NCAA litigation has demonstrated the ease with which
defendants can succeed by offering even the most superficial
arguments for balancing. Indeed, that litigation receives
disproportionately little attention in antitrust scholarship given the
degree to which it has refuted assumptions regarding the purported
welfare-enhancing effects of intergroup offsets.
More recently, Professor Steven C. Salop and others proffered three
criteria, whose collective satisfaction would permit cross-platform
balancing.113 These authors also argue that the Supreme Court should
directly overrule American Express 114 and adopt the analytical
framework they propose, which includes the following three prongs:
(1) Causal contingency as the test for counting beneficial
effects on other sides of the platform; (2) correct allocation
of the burdens of proof (harms for plaintiffs; benefits for
defendants); and (3) the principle that harms and benefits on
all sides of the platform must be included to protect against
cherry-picking that may give a court a misleading picture of
the balance of a measure’s effects.115
The prescription that a causal nexus must exist between the restraint
and any procompetitive justifications is consistent with the arguments
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
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we offer in this Article. That the restraint must receive credit by
causing the benefits reflects a logically correct position that should
undergo little opposition. Our disagreement lies with the ambit of its
justifications. Although a causal nexus should exist between restraint
and procompetitive justifications when balancing intragroup effects,
it has little, if any, effective application to intergroup differences. A
defendant could easily meet the causal criteria by distributing even a
small portion of the benefit onto a group other than the one injured by
the restraint. Professor Salop and others’ approach has the immediate
defect of classifying the restraint as ancillary rather than naked and
thus precluding condemnation under the per se rule, which is precisely
how wage-fixing cases should be treated. Consider again the NCAA
case: So long as the NCAA could show that “amateurism” benefited
consumers by reducing stadium box seat prices, this effect may be
sufficient to evade per se condemnation, even in the face of obvious
and direct evidence of harm to labor. Because the amateurism restraint
would likely satisfy their causal contingency test, the likely result
would mirror the current status quo. Accordingly, we reject their
proposal.
Furthermore, suppose five competing firms entered into a no-poach
agreement not to hire each other’s employees. Suppose further that,
consistent with the causal contingency test that Professor Salop and
others propose, the competitors defended the restraint as ancillary
because they passed a portion of the wage savings onto consumers.
The restraint would meet the causal nexus test and thus wrongly remit
adjudication to the rule of reason. Proponents of the consumer welfare
standard might argue that, in the name of efficiency, one could
calculate the total dollar savings to consumers and balance them
against the lost wages to laborers. This reasoning reflects the
ideological belief that antitrust review should ignore distributive
justice and focus solely on efficiency, a prescription which University
of Utah Professor Mark A. Glick and Associate Professor Gabriel A.
Lozada refer to as “the Separation Hypothesis,” based on the
proposition that the latter lends itself to positive rather than normative
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identification and quantification. 116 But as these authors note,
outcomes that result in Pareto Improvements depend on the starting
distribution.117 Indeed, the NCAA argued that paying college athletes
would have a negative financial impact on other sports that depend on
the redistribution of revenues from football and basketball—the
primary revenue generators. But, of course, this ignores the fact that
athletes in those sports were made worse off in the first place by the
restraint, and removing it only serves to redress the original antitrust
harm.
Finally, on purely conceptual grounds, divorcing antitrust policy
from the holistic ambit of social policy makes little sense. Consumer
welfare is a normative concept; it prescribes that society should
embrace lower prices and greater output because these values signal
some benefit to the individual as a consumer. Further, if society has
decided to safeguard minority classes on the basis of race, gender,
religion, and other protected characteristics from the tyranny of the
majority, then why permit antitrust policy to counteract such efforts?
As we and others have explained elsewhere, and as Justice Kavanaugh
noted in his concurring opinion, the NCAA’s restraint does exactly
that. 118 In raising the possibility that economists can develop a
mathematically defensible method for cross-market analysis, Judge
Smith concluded that “we do not currently have such a method, and it
may equally be the case that no such method is possible or
desirable.”119 We argue that that is precisely the case, both from an
economic and a moral standpoint.120
116. Glick & Lozada, supra note 15, at 26.
117. Id. at 27–28 (“However, the set of points which are Pareto Improvements completely depends on
what the original distribution was, and distribution affects prices, which in turn affect the valuation of any
commodity bundle.”).
118. NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2168 (2021) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“College presidents,
athletic directors, coaches, conference commissioners, and NCAA executives take in six- and seven-figure
salaries. Colleges build lavish new facilities. But the student athletes who generate the revenues, many of
whom are African American and from lower-income backgrounds, end up with little or nothing.”).
119. Alston v. NCAA (In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig.), 958 F.3d 1239, 1271
(9th Cir. 2020) (Smith, J., concurring), aff’d sub nom. NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021).
120. In doing so, we echo MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 590 (Cambridge Univ.
Press, 4th ed. 1990) (“Thus, the long discussion on welfare criteria—from Pareto through Barone to Hicks,
Kaldor and Scitovsky—has brought us no further in evaluating policy changes which benefit some people
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C. The Need for Legislative Intervention
The extent to which cross-market balancing pervades antitrust
litigation has largely evaded attention, although Alston should serve to
thrust this issue squarely into the limelight. In his American Express
dissent, Justice Breyer argued that “[a] Sherman Act §1 defendant can
rarely, if ever, show that a procompetitive benefit in the market for one
product offsets an anticompetitive harm in the market for another.”121
As a counterpoint, this very argument has permitted the NCAA cartel
to evade condemnation under antitrust law. In Alston, the Supreme
Court had the opportunity to clarify the incongruity of cross-market
balancing within the ambit and precedent of antitrust law, and in the
face of a blatant wage-fixing conspiracy, yet it demurred. In doing so,
the Court permitted a cavalcade of cross-market justifications from
defense experts in various Section 1 of the Sherman Act cases that,
given Justice Breyer’s comment, the Supreme Court might be expected
to reject. Even more glaringly, the NCAA’s survival serves as a
reminder that antitrust law has failed to curtail cartel behavior in the
face of incontrovertible and direct evidence of harm by justifying it as
a nebulous benefit to another group.122
Consistent with Judge Smith’s aforementioned concurrence in the
Ninth Circuit’s Alston case and the Supreme Court’s precedent in
Topco,123 we submit that broad policy judgments that affect the social
welfare are best suited for legislative intervention and should not be
delegated to the judiciary. That is not to say that antitrust has no role
in effectuating those policy choices. It most certainly does, but the
but harm others on purely ‘positive’ grounds. Efficiency questions appears to be inseparable from equity
questions.”)
121. Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2303 (2018) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
122. Alston, 958 F.3d at 1270 (Smith, J., concurring) (“It was enough for the NCAA to meet its Step
Two burden that it could show (however feebly) a procompetitive effect in a collateral market.”).
123. See generally United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). Unlike the legislature,
the courts are not equipped to make broad policy judgements:
If a decision is to be made to sacrifice competition in one portion of the economy
for greater competition in another portion this [] is a decision that must be made by
Congress and not by private forces or by the courts. Private forces are too keenly
aware of their own interests in making such decisions and courts are ill-equipped
and ill-situated for such decisionmaking.
Id. at 611.
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impetus should have a statutory origin that the judiciary will enforce.
As such, we argue that legislative intervention should reverse
American Express and prohibit, via a “no-offset rule,” the type of
misguided “balancing” of one group’s interests against another’s
regardless of whether the groups operate in the same multi-sided
market or in separate markets altogether. In wage-fixing cases
involving multiple defendants, the no-offset rule would bar courts
from considering any claimed efficiencies, regardless of whom they
benefit. In single-firm monopsony cases, the no-offset rule would bar
courts from considering any offsetting benefits to parties other than the
injured group of workers or input providers.
The legislation should make clear that harm to a worker or any input
provider should be sufficient to generate antitrust liability, without any
need to explore effects to different parties. As Alston demonstrated,
defenses in the latter can mirror those in the former, elevating form
over substantive function, a prescription that courts have repeatedly
rejected.124 The legislature should enjoin any attempts to balance the
harms to labor or other input providers by some perceived benefit to
consumers. Failure to do so only serves to sustain the confusing
antitrust environment that American Express and Alston have so
clearly illuminated.
CONCLUSION
The practice of offsetting harms to labor input by claimed output
benefits, exemplified in the logical error that characterized the
consumer preference justification for not compensating the athlete
labor in Board of Regents, has created an artificial friction between
workers and consumer interest. As observed in NCAA antitrust
litigation, the search for even the most specious offsets has resulted in
the justification of harms to labor even in the presence of direct
evidence of antitrust injury to a group of workers. This practice has
eroded per se adjudication of cartel behavior by expanding the
definition of ancillary restraints.
124. See generally Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141.
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We argue that, consistent with the intent of the Sherman Act,
antitrust law should protect workers and consumers equally, rather
than elevating the interests of the latter over the former. To achieve
this goal, in addition to arguing for a statutory repeal of the American
Express decision, we propose a prohibition on judicial balancing of
claimed benefits to any group other than the group that suffered an
antitrust injury. Prohibiting such balancing would be consistent with
the broader policy of protecting labor from anticompetitive conduct,
including the exercise of monopsony power. In wage-fixing cases
involving multiple defendants, the no-offset rule would immediately
condemn the restraint as per se illegal and bar courts from considering
any claimed efficiencies, regardless of whom they benefit. In
single-firm monopsony cases, the no-offset rule would bar courts from
considering any offsetting benefits to parties other than the injured
group of workers or input providers.
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